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Abstract
Many American jurisdictions use algorithmic risk assessments
when setting bail or deciding whether to detain criminal defendants
before trial. Although the use of risk assessments has been touted as
a reform to protect public safety and reduce bias against defendants,
algorithmic
risk
assessments’
opacity
and
racialized
recommendations present serious concerns. This Article examines
whether algorithmic risk assessments used during pretrial
adjudications violate Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
rights on the basis of race. The Article begins with an overview of
algorithmic risk assessments in the pretrial justice system, focusing
on the history of their implementation and how they work. The
Article then examines the limited judicial opinions on the
constitutionality of these risk assessments. Next, the Article analyzes
pretrial algorithmic risk assessments with respect to Equal
Protection rights, arguing that they facially discriminate on the
basis of race. Additionally, the Article argues that these risk
assessments result in disparate treatment of members of this
protected class because of one of three types of intentional
discrimination: deliberate indifference to racial targeting,
discriminatory animus from algorithm designers, or discriminatory
intent from the algorithm itself under a proposed theory of partial
legal capacity for artificial intelligences. Finally, the Article
contends that the use of algorithmic risk assessments is not narrowly
tailored, and in many pretrial contexts the state cannot meet its
burden of proving that the algorithms are narrowly tailored, due to
their opacity. The Article concludes with a discussion of promising
and more equitable alternative approaches to pretrial justice.
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Introduction
Each year, over half a million people in the United States are
held in local jails before trial, even though they have not been
convicted of a crime.1 Although pretrial preventive detention for
public safety has been legally sanctioned since United States v.
Salerno was decided in 1987, most legally innocent people in
pretrial detention are held not for public safety reasons, but due to
a racially differential inability to make cash bail.2 These stints in
1. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/EN4P-BVWW].
2. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Christine Scott-Hayward
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pretrial detention, however brief, have been found to worsen case
outcomes and lead to job losses, housing disruptions, family
problems, or other damages.3 In that context, many state and local
jurisdictions have adopted the use of predictive analytics as part of
pretrial justice reform in recent years.4 These tools use
computational algorithms5 to evaluate a criminal defendant’s risk
of rearrest before trial or failure to appear in court. Defendants are
assigned a “risk score” ranging from low to high that judges use
& Sarah Ottone, Punishing Poverty: California’s Unconstitutional Bail System, 70
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 167, 168 n.6, 170 (2018) [https://perma.cc/C9AS-3DRR]; Will
Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned
Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201–02 (2018), https://www.princeton.edu/~wdob
bie/files/bail.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYP6-F9Y9]; see generally MIKAELA RABINOWITZ,
INCARCERATION WITHOUT CONVICTION: PRETRIAL DETENTION AND THE EROSION OF
INNOCENCE IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2021) (highlighting how not being able
to make cash bail leads to guilty pleas and in-turn mass incarceration); CHRISTINE
S. SCOTT-HAYWARD & HENRY F. FRADELLA, PUNISHING POVERTY: HOW BAIL AND
PRETRIAL DETENTION FUEL INEQUALITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2019)
(discussing the social and economic ramifications of not being able to make bail).
3. See Natalie Goulette & John Wooldredge, Collateral Consequences of Pretrial
Detention, in HANDBOOK ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT
DECISIONS 271, 278–81 (Beth M. Huebner & Natasha A. Frost eds., 2018) (reviewing
prior research on the effects of pretrial detention); see also Sara Wakefield & Lars
Højsgaard Andersen, Pretrial Detention and the Costs of System Overreach for
Employment and Family Life, 7 SOCIO. SCI. 342 (2020) (demonstrating the effect of
pretrial detention on jobs and family); Christopher Thomas, The Racialized
Consequences of Jail Incarceration on Local Labor Markets, RACE & JUST., May 2022,
at 1, 11–14 (demonstrating that pretrial detention has racialized negative effects on
local labor markets); Christopher M. Campbell, Ryan M. Labrecque, Michael
Weinerman & Ken Sanchagrin, Gauging Detention Dosage: Assessing the Impact of
Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes Using Propensity Score Modeling, J.
CRIM. JUST., Aug. 2020, at 1, 9–10 (2020) (finding that people detained pretrial are
about twice as likely to be sentenced to prison as people released pretrial).
4. See Sarah L. Desmarais, Samantha A. Zottola, Sarah E. Duhart Clarke &
Evan M. Lowder, Predictive Validity of Pretrial Risk Assessments: A Systematic
Review of the Literature, 48 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 398, 398 (2021); Sharad Goel, Ravi
Shroff, Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Slobogin, The Accuracy, Equity, and
Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BIG DATA
LAW 9, 9 (2021); Lila Kazemian, Candace McCoy & Meghan Sacks, Does Law Matter?
An Old Bail Law Confronts the New Penology, 15 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 43, 45–46
(2013).
5. See THOMAS H. CORMEN, CHARLES E. LEISERSON, RONALD L. RIVEST &
CLIFFORD STEIN, INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (3d ed. 2009) (defining algorithms
broadly as “any well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set
of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output”); see also
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. Huq, Toward the Democratic Regulation of AI
Systems: A Prolegomenon 1, 5 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 753, 2020)
(distinguishing between AI technology, defined as “technology relying on computing
algorithms to discern patterns in data, and then trigger actions or recommendations
in response,” and the more legally pertinent concept of AI systems, defined as “a
sociotechnical embodiment of public policy codified in an appropriate computational
learning tool and embedded in a specific institutional context”).
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when making release or bail decisions. Theoretically, these
algorithmic risk assessment tools (hereinafter RATs) reduce the
burden of work for courts, reduce biases among judges and court
officials, and make more accurate predictions about defendant
“riskiness.”6 However, compelling objections have been raised about
the use of these algorithmic RATs in the criminal justice system
generally, calling into question whether these tools are the best way
to achieve these goals.7
Almost all states have adopted the use of RATs at some stage
of the criminal justice process, ranging from arrest to parole.8
Currently over eighteen states and dozens of other local
jurisdictions have enacted legislation mandating the use of crime
RATs in pre- and post-trial stages.9 Yet, an extremely limited
number of courts have opined on the novel issue of whether
algorithm-based RATs in the criminal justice system violate a
defendant’s constitutional rights.10
The rapid adoption of algorithmic RATs in the criminal justice
system has already prompted legal and policy debate over issues of
6. See Evan M. Lowder, Carmen L. Diaz, Eric Grommon & Bradley R. Ray,
Effects of Pretrial Risk Assessments on Release Decisions and Misconduct Outcomes
Relative to Practice as Usual, 73 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 1, 1–2 (2021); N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law
§ 510.30; Michael Rempel & Tia Pooler, Reducing Pretrial Detention in New York
City, 23 SISTEMAS JUDICIALES 1, 3 (2020) (noting that riskiness is usually
conceptualized with respect to public safety, but a few states, such as New York, only
allow one legal justification for pretrial detention: risk of not attending future court
appearances).
7. See Aziz Z. Huq, Artificial Intelligence and the Rule of Law (U. Chi., Pub. L.
Working Paper No. 764, 2021); Tim O’Brien, Compounding Injustice: The Cascading
Effect of Algorithmic Bias in Risk Assessments, 13 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE
PERSP. 39, 41 (2021); Gina M. Vincent & Jodi L. Viljoen, Racist Algorithms or
Systemic Problems? Risk Assessments and Racial Disparities, 47 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 1576, 1577 (2020).
8. Melissa Hamilton, We Use Big Data to Sentence Criminals. But Can the
Algorithms Really Tell Us What We Need to Know?, GOV’T TECH. (Jun. 6, 2017),
https://www.govtech.com/data/We-Use-Big-Data-to-Sentence-Criminals-But-Canthe-Algorithms-Really-Tell-Us-What-We-Need-to-Know.html
[https://perma.cc/
MYF3-MZRJ].
9. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S.
Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-6387) 2017 WL 2333897; AI in the Criminal Justice System,
ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/
[https://perma.cc/L5D7-S9WD] (detailing the use of artificial intelligence in the
criminal justice system by state); John Villasenor & Virginia Foggo, Algorithms and
Sentencing: What Does Due Process Require?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 21, 2019)
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/21/algorithms-and-sentencingwhat-does-due-process-require/ [https://perma.cc/MS65-AG74 ] (quoting MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (AM. L. INST, Proposed Final Draft 2017)).
10. Erin Harbinson, Understanding ‘Risk Assessment’ Tools What They Are and
the Role They Play in the Criminal Justice System: A Primer, 75 BENCH & BAR MINN.
14, 16 (2018) (stating only Indiana and Wisconsin “have considered th[e] issue
directly . . .”).
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race and ethnicity and RATs’ impact on people of color. For example,
some scholars and legal actors assert that these new RATs present
a more inclusive, objective, and complete report on defendants, thus
reducing potential racial and ethnic biases from judges.11
Conversely, other experts have raised serious concerns about the
use of these tools in the legal field because they are opaque, operate
at a massive scale “to sort, target, or ‘optimize’ millions of people”
in racialized ways, and are reinforced by bias-multiplying feedback
loops.12 This raises the question, does the use of RATs in the
criminal justice system in fact violate a defendant’s constitutional
rights? As these tools become more widely adopted in jurisdictions
across the United States, critical examination of these nuanced and
complex systems needs to guide this new regime of algorithmic
pretrial justice that could be imperiling the fundamental rights of
people of color in particular.
This Article examines whether algorithmic RATs used during
pretrial adjudications violate a criminal defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection rights. Particularly, the Article
argues that these tools impermissibly use race and ethnicity to
calculate a defendant’s risk score. Part I presents an overview of
algorithmic RATs in the pretrial justice system, focusing on the
history of their implementation, how they work, and which
jurisdictions have adopted their use so far. Part II examines the
limited judicial opinions on the constitutionality of pretrial
algorithmic RATs. Part III analyzes the use of pretrial RATs vis-àvis Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights. This Section
argues that the instruments facially discriminate on the basis of
suspect classifications. This Section alternatively argues that
pretrial RATs result in disparate treatment of members of these
protected classes due to one of three forms of discriminatory intent:
11. See, e.g., Adam Neufeld, In Defense of Risk-Assessment Tools, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/22/in-defenseof-risk-assessment-tools [https://perma.cc/EP4U-5TAB] (defending the use of
algorithmic risk assessment tools and discussing what needs to be done to make
them successful); but cf. More than 100 Civil Rights, Digital Justice, and CommunityBased Organizations Raise Concerns About Pretrial Risk Assessment, LEADERSHIP
CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (Jul. 30, 2018), https://civilrights.org/2018/07/30/morethan-100-civil-rights-digital-justice-and-community-based-organizations-raise-conc
erns-about-pretrial-risk-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/FU5T-YJH7] (emphasizing
that ending money bail requirements does not necessarily mean pretrial risk
assessments are the more equitable solution).
12. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 12 (2016); see also Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey
Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas, 107 CAL. L. REV. 345, 398
(2019) (reviewing how “high-crime feedback loops” are created by racially biased
policing).
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deliberate indifference to racial targeting, discriminatory animus
from algorithm designers, or discriminatory intent from the
algorithm itself under a novel theory of partial legal capacity for
artificial intelligences. Further, this Section contends that the tools’
use is not narrowly tailored, and the state cannot meet its burden
of proof of narrow tailoring due to the tools’ opacity. Part IV lists
important limitations and considerations of an Equal Protection
challenge to algorithmic RATs. Lastly, Part V concludes that the
tools violate Equal Protection rights and should be banned from use
in pretrial adjudications.
I. Overview of Algorithmic Risk Assessments Used in the
Pretrial Justice System
Predictive analytic systems have permeated throughout many
steps of the criminal justice processes. For instance, many police
departments use “hot-spot maps” based on algorithmic risk
assessments to strategize deployment of officers and surveillance of
specific neighborhoods.13 Some police departments also use “focused
deterrence” approaches to algorithmically identify “high-risk”
potential reoffenders within “risky” social networks, who the police
then target with either social services or, most commonly, police
contact or arrest on low-level crimes as a way to purportedly deter
them from committing future crimes.14 In courts, algorithms are
commonly used to create risk assessments of individuals accused of
committing a crime.15 It is contended that these risk assessments
help judges and other court officials make important
determinations, including whether defendants are “dangerous” to

13. See Lyria Bennett Moses & Janet Chan, Algorithmic Prediction in Policing:
Assumptions, Evaluation, and Accountability, 28 POLICING AND SOC’Y 806, 808
(2018); Laura Myers, Allen Parrish & Alexis Williams, Big Data and the Fourth
Amendment: Reducing Overreliance on the Objectivity of Predictive Policing, 8 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 231, 236 (2015); see also Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case
of Policing, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 977 (2017) (describing how police use algorithmic
predictions in practice).
14. See Anthony A. Braga, David Weisburd & Brandon Turchan, Focused
Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control: An Updated Systematic Review and MetaAnalysis of the Empirical Evidence, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 205, 208–09
(2018); see generally ANDREW FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING (2017)
(analyzing the effect of big data on policing).
15. See Vienna Thompkins, What Are Risk Assessments — and How Do They
Advance Criminal Justice Reform?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 23, 2018)
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/what-are-risk-assessmen
ts-and-how-do-they-advance-criminal-justice-reform
[https://perma.cc/7EDCTFPU]; CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT 10 (2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Publications/
PJI_PretrialRiskAssessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F6T-PVEX].
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the community or whether they are likely to reoffend.16 How do
these RATs work? And how did they become a standard practice in
the pretrial justice system?
In 1961, a young journalist started the Manhattan Bail Project
(which grew into the organization now known as the Vera Institute
of Justice), pioneering the use of simple pretrial risk assessments
in an effort to reduce discriminatory bias among judges and release
more criminal defendants pretrial.17 The project’s “Vera Point
Scale” involved an interviewer at arraignment ticking off a checklist
of five weighted static factors purportedly associated with failing to
appear in court among prior defendants (since flight risk was
historically the only legally permissible risk to consider for pretrial
detention).18 Only 1.6% of defendants released using the Vera Point
Scale failed to appear, compared to 3% of those released on bail
without the Scale.19 Despite this success, the first wave of the
checklist was found to focus too much on local ties to the community,
so to accommodate people without such ties who were nonetheless
low flight risks, the Vera Point Scale was modified.20 The
subsequent tool was so successful that it quickly spread from New
York to other jurisdictions and was used widely for decades.21
However, after the punitive turn of the late 1970s and
throughout the 1980s,22 many judges started to explicitly consider
16. See MAMALIAN, supra note 15, at 18–20. Note that reoffending is usually
operationalized as being arrested again before trial, despite the extensive literature
documenting racial disparities in arrests, holding constant levels of committing
crimes, as discussed below.
17. See Scott Kohler, Vera Institute of Justice: Manhattan Bail Project, in
CASEBOOK FOR THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 81, 81–82 (2007); see
also SCOTT-HAYWARD & FRADELLA, supra note 2, at 95–96 (explaining
standardization promotes both consistency and transparency concerning pretrial
release).
18. See MARION C. KATSIVE, NEW AREAS FOR BAIL REFORM: A REPORT ON THE
MANHATTAN BAIL REEVALUATION PROJECT 32–33 (1968) (noting in the first Vera
Point Scale “[t]he defendant is evaluated on the basis of five factors - length of
residence in jurisdiction, length of time at present employment, source of support,
ties to family in the area in terms of frequency of contact, and prior conviction
record”).
19. See Kohler, supra note 17.
20. See KATSIVE, supra note 18, at app. 3 (showing the later modified checklist
focused on a more inclusive set of facts that could be cited in support of bail reduction,
which one checklist from that period listed as “family ties verified in court[,]” “[h]as
job to return to[,]” “[r]eturn date more than a week away[,]” “[n]o prior record[,]”
“[l]ast conviction more than 4 years earlier[,]” “[e]vidence probably won’t support
conviction[,]” “[a]ge (if over 50)[,]” “[f]emale with dependent children[,]” and “[i]llness
or pregnancy”).
21. Kohler, supra note 17, at 82.
22. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2012) (explaining how social, economic,
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“danger” to the community in their pretrial detention
determinations.23 This punitive turn toward a new type of risk
became institutionalized after the Salerno decision in 1987.24 In
that decade and the 1990s, there was an explosion of criminological
research on risk assessments generally and in the pretrial context
specifically.25 Most RATs in this period were simple clinical
weighted checklists like the Vera Point Scale, though more complex
actuarial pretrial risk assessments were beginning to get developed;
yet, by the turn of the twenty-first century, only twelve local
jurisdictions were using formal algorithmic RATs in pretrial
hearings.26 Since then, algorithmic pretrial RATs have proliferated.
Most of today’s pretrial algorithmic RATs are regressionbased—that is, designed to statistically analyze complex
interactions of variables to predict how likely a defendant is to
either get rearrested before trial or fail to appear in court.27 Some
of them combine administrative data from “court and demographic
records with some sort of questionnaire administered by a court
official, such as a pretrial services officer . . . .”28 The tools assign a
numerical value and weight based on considerations of static and
dynamic factors such as demographic data, criminal history,
employment status, level of education, and family background.29
Weighting of these interacting factors is a particularly important
part of the models because it influences the output variable that the
model predicts. Nevertheless, some commercial RATs keep this
weighting information private due to the proprietary nature of their
products.30 Most of the current pretrial RATs are regression-based,
and political forces in the late twentieth century reshaped criminological thought).
23. See PRETRIAL JUST. INST., OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS ON PRETRIAL
RISK ASSESSMENT AND PRETRIAL SUPERVISION 2–3 (2008).
24. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
25. See PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 23, at 5 (finding that “study after study
has failed to replicate the findings of previous studies,” suggesting that researchers
were not converging on a reliable set of predictors).
26. See SCOTT-HAYWARD & FRADELLA, supra note 2, at 95–96.
27. See Matt Henry, Risk Assessment: Explained, APPEAL (Dec. 14, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/risk-assessment-explained/ [https://perma.cc/QL6Z-FUCU].
28. See id.
29. See id.; Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Ben Casselman & Dana Goldstein, The
New
Science
of
Sentencing,
MARSHALL PROJECT
(Aug.
4,
2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/MAL2-73SG].
30. See Henry, supra note 27 (“The process of setting the weights is known as
training the model. In the machine learning context, this is known as supervised
learning. A data set is fed into the model that contains a set of features, such as age,
number of prior arrests, etc. . . . . [I]f the model is supposed to predict likelihood of
rearrest within two years (as it is in many risk assessment tools), the data used to
train the model would have a big data set formatted much like a spreadsheet that
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such as COMPAS and the more transparent Arnold Venture’s
Public Safety Assessment (hereinafter the PSA).31
The newest generation of RATs involve machine learning,
making them a type of artificial intelligence.32 Unlike earlier
generations of pretrial risk assessments, which relied to varying
extents on expert judgment from psychologists, social workers,
probation officers, or other justice system actors, machine learning
algorithmic RATs do not depend on human judgment. Instead,
these algorithms are designed to mimic how humans learn how to
solve complex tasks, changing on their own to learn new rules and
rationales for decision-making.33 Designers identify a particular
outcome of interest (such as likelihood of arrest before trial), then
design algorithms that explore a given dataset and identify complex
patterns to make predictions, evolving as they work through more
data to get closer to the desired outcome; in supervised machine
learning, the algorithms learn how to use training data to replicate
a human-identified pattern, whereas in unsupervised machine
learning, the algorithms are even more divorced from human
oversight, instead teaching themselves some inherent structure in
the unlabeled data.34 The key aspect of machine learning RATs for
the purposes of this paper’s argument is that the precise ways the
algorithms use data points such as race and ethnicity are inherently
unknowable because they are not programmed directly by humans.
In short, both types of pretrial RATs are “designed to do one thing:
take in the details of a defendant’s profile and spit out a recidivism
associated values of the input variables with a value for the output variable (i.e.,
prediction).”).
31. See Tim Brennan, William Dieterich & Beate Ehret, Evaluating the
Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment System, 36 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 21, 24 (2009) (describing how COMPAS uses “logistic regression,
survival analysis, and bootstrap classification methods . . .”).
32. See Doaa Abu Elyounes, Bail or Jail? Judicial Versus Algorithmic DecisionMaking in the Pretrial System, 21 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 376, 389 (2020)
(discussing a machine learning RAT developed by Professor Jon Kleinberg at Cornell
University); see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. Huq, Privacy’s Political
Economy and the State of Machine Learning: An Essay in Honor of Stephen J.
Schulhofer, N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 2 (forthcoming) (explaining the increase of
machine learning in America after 9/11); Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law,
89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89 (2014) (discussing the interplay between artificial
intelligence and law).
33. See L. Karl Branting, Artificial Intelligence and the Law from a Research
Perspective, 14 SCITECH LAW. 32, 34–35 (2018).
34. See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 657 (4th
ed. 2021); THOMAS W. MALONE, DANIELA RUS & ROBERT LAUBACHER, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, MIT Research Brief 17 (Dec. 2020),
https://workofthefuture.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2020-Research-BriefMalone-Rus-Laubacher2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L23Z-62W5].
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score—a single number estimating the likelihood that [the
defendant] will reoffend” before trial (or, in some jurisdictions, not
show up to court).35 As explained below, the tools have been
criticized for being biased, treating defendants differently on the
basis of their race or ethnicity, and heavily influencing a judge’s
decision-making.
II. Judicial Interpretations Directly Addressing
Algorithms Used in Criminal Justice and Other
Relevant Settings
Few courts have opined on the novel issue of whether
algorithm-based RATs in the criminal justice system violate a
defendant’s constitutional rights. At the state level, Wisconsin and
Indiana are the only two states where their highest courts have
addressed the issue directly, generally affirming the use of
algorithmic risk assessments for sentencing determinations.
Conversely, federal courts have declined to rule on whether the use
of predictive analytics violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional
protections. There is, however, a recent civil case in a Texas district
court that may shed some light on the issue. There, a teachers’
union brought an action against a school district, alleging that the
district’s use of an algorithmic evaluation system used to terminate
teachers for ineffective performance violated their due process and
equal protection rights. The following sections summarize these
three cases.
A. State of Wisconsin v. Loomis
In 2013, the State of Wisconsin charged defendant Eric Loomis
with five criminal counts for allegedly participating as the driver in
a drive-by shooting.36 While Loomis denied his involvement in that
shooting, he ultimately accepted a guilty plea to only two of the
lesser charges: “attempting to flee a traffic officer and operating a
motor vehicle without the owner’s consent.”37 Subsequently, the
circuit court ordered a pre-sentence investigation, resulting in a
report (hereinafter PSI) that included a risk assessment prepared
by COMPAS, a privately-owned algorithmic tool.38 COMPAS
reports only present “risk scores displayed in the form of a bar chart,
35. See Karen Hao, AI is Sending People to Jail – and Getting it Wrong, MIT
TECH. REV. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775/algorithmscriminal-justice-ai/ [https://perma.cc/39FA-A67E].
36. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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with three bars that represent pretrial recidivism risk, general
recidivism risk, and violent recidivism risk.”39
These scores are based on the defendant’s criminal history and
an interview conducted with the defendant. However, the scores are
not individualized; they are a standardized prediction of recidivism
“based on a comparison of information about the individual to a
similar data group.”40 Based in part on these scores, Loomis was
sentenced by the trial court to six years in prison followed by five
years of extended supervision.41
On appeal, Loomis challenged the use of COMPAS at
sentencing, alleging it violated his right to due process.42
Specifically, Loomis argued that (1) “the proprietary nature of
COMPAS prevent[ed him] from challenging the COMPAS
assessment’s scientific validity,” (2) COMPAS risk assessments
impermissibly take gender into account, and (3) the use of aggregate
data to calculate risk scores violated his right “to an individualized
sentence.”43 The Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately affirmed his
sentence.44
First, the court found that Loomis did not meet “his burden of
showing that the circuit court actually relied on gender as a factor
in sentencing.”45 Moreover, even if COMPAS did consider gender,
the court determined that such a factor is necessary to promote
statistical accuracy.46 The State specifically argued in this regard
that “because men and women have different rates of recidivism
and different rehabilitation potential, a gender neutral risk
assessment would provide inaccurate results for both men and
women.”47 Second, the court found that the proprietary nature of
the COMPAS algorithm did not infringe upon Loomis’s due process
rights because COMPAS largely relies on reviewable public data.48
A practitioner’s guide to COMPAS explained that “the risk scores
are based largely on static information (criminal history), with
limited use of some dynamic variables (i.e., criminal associates,

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 756 n.18.
42. Id. at 757.
43. Id. at 753, 757. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified these questions to
the State’s Supreme Court.
44. Id. at 754.
45. Id. at 767.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 765.
48. Id. at 761.
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substance abuse)” and a questionnaire filled by the defendant.49 In
other words, “to the extent that [his] risk assessment is based upon
his answers to questions and publicly available data,” Loomis “had
the opportunity to verify that the questions and answers listed on
the COMPAS report were accurate,” even though the algorithmic
formula, which predicts the score, is unavailable for review.50
Lastly, the court agreed that COMPAS did use aggregate,
unvalidated data to calculate his risk score.51 Nevertheless,
COMPAS risk assessments were not a “determinative factor” in his
sentencing.52 As such, sentencing ultimately relies on the discretion
of a judge, which is informed by many factors included in the PSI.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that while
sentencing courts may consider COMPAS RATs for sentencing
determinations, they may not use risk scores to determine “whether
an offender is incarcerated”; “the severity of the sentence”; or
“whether an offender can be supervised safely and effectively in the
community.”53 In addition, sentencing courts were required to
generally explain the factors used to make sentencing decisions.
The court further mandated that PSIs containing a COMPAS
assessment include a “written advisement listing [its]
limitations.”54 The five limitations were: (1) “[t]he proprietary
nature of COMPAS . . . prevent[s] disclosure of . . . how risk scores
are determined”; (2) because COMPAS only relies on aggregate
data, it was unable to identify “a particular high-risk individual”;
(3) “[s]ome studies of COMPAS risk assessment scores have raised
questions about whether they disproportionately classify minority
offenders as having a higher risk of recidivism”; (4) “[a] COMPAS
risk assessment compares defendants to a national sample, but no
cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population has yet been
completed”; and (5) COMPAS was originally intended “for use by
the Department of Corrections in making determinations regarding
treatment, supervision, and parole.”55
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, acknowledged the
possibility of an equal protection challenge based on the use of
gender in statistical generalizations. In its reasoning, the court
specifically referenced Craig v. Boren, where an Oklahoma law was
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 764–65.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 769–70.
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challenged for prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to men under
twenty-one years of age and women under eighteen years of age.56
There, the United States Supreme Court declared that
“classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives”—a standard that was not met in Craig.57 The Loomis
court specifically noted the Supreme Court’s explanation that
sociological and empirical justifications for gender-based
classifications may not pass judicial scrutiny because “the
principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause are not to be
rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting
generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate
groups.”58 Notwithstanding the Wisconsin court’s analogy of Craig
v. Boren to the Loomis facts, the court refused to entertain the equal
protection challenge because Loomis failed to directly raise it.59
Accordingly, the court only focused on his due process claims.
In a concurrence, Justice Shirley Abrahamson agreed with the
judgment, but stated she would have required sentencing courts to
specifically “evaluate on the record the strengths, weaknesses, and
relevance to the individualized sentence . . . .”60 Such explanation
was necessary because COMPAS risk assessment had “garnered
mixed reviews in the scholarly literature and in popular
commentary and analysis.”61 In addition, Justice Abrahamson
raised a concern with the “court’s lack of understanding of COMPAS
. . . .”62 She took issue with the court’s denial of “[COMPAS’ then
owner] Northpointe’s motion to file an amicus brief,” since it could
have provided critical information about COMPAS.63
B. Malenchik v. State
Unlike the Loomis court’s cautionary allowance of algorithmic
risk assessments in sentencing, the Supreme Court of Indiana

56. See id. at 766; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
57. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
58. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 766 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 208–09).
59. Id. (“Notably, however, Loomis does not bring an equal protection challenge
in this case. Thus, we address . . . Loomis’s constitutional due process right
[claims] . . . .”).
60. Id. at 774 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 774–75.
62. Id. at 774 (“At oral argument, the court repeatedly questioned both the
State’s and defendant’s counsel about how COMPAS works. Few answers were
available.”).
63. Id.
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enthusiastically affirmed their use in Malenchik v. State.64 In late
2008, defendant Anthony Malenchik was convicted and sentenced
to six years in prison, pursuant to his guilty plea to theft and his
admission to being a habitual offender.65 In preparation for
sentencing, the trial court was presented with a PSI indicating that
Malenchik “f[ell] into the High Risk/Needs category” and “ha[d] a
high probability of having a Substance Dependence Disorder,”
based on reports created by algorithmic risk assessment
instruments, including one named Level of Service Inventory–
Revised (hereinafter LSI–R).66 LSI–R generally measures
recidivism by taking into consideration a defendant’s “areas of
Criminal History, Education and Employment, Financial, Family,
Accommodations, Leisure and Recreation, Companions, Alcohol
and Drugs, Emotional and Personal Issues, and Attitudes and
Orientation,” combined with other demographic information.67 LSI–
R is a privately owned algorithmic tool.68
The Supreme Court of Indiana granted transfer from the
appellate court to resolve the specific issue of whether a trial court
may consider, and to what extent, reports from algorithmic risk
assessment instruments when making sentencing determinations.
64. See Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010).
65. See id. at 566; see also Malenchik v. State, 908 N.E.2d 710 (Table), 2009 WL
1577832, *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming the conviction after Malenchik appealed
his sentence, arguing the trial court abused its discretion).
66. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 567.
67. Id.; see also Anthony W. Flores, Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Paula Smith &
Edward J. Latessa, Validating the Level of Service Inventory—Revised on a Sample
of Federal Probationers, 70 FED. PROB. 44, 45 (2006) (citations omitted).
The LSI-R measures 54 risk and need factors about 10 criminogenic domains
that are designed to inform correctional decisions of custody, supervision, and
service provision. The theoretically informed predictor domains measured by
the LSI-R include criminal history, education/employment, financial situation,
family/marital relationships, accommodation, leisure and recreation,
companions, alcohol or drug use, emotional/mental health, and attitudes and
orientations.
The LSI-R assessment is administered through a structured interview between
the assessor and offender, with the recommendation that supporting
documentation be collected from family members, employers, case files, drug
tests, and other relevant sources as needed. The total risk/need score produced
by the LSI-R is indicative of the number of predictor items (out of 54) scored as
currently present for the offender. The LSI-R score is then actuarially
associated with a likelihood of recidivism that was derived from the observed
recidivism rates of previously assessed offenders. Last, domain scores of the
LSI-R are used to identify an offender’s most promising treatment targets.
Id.
68. See MEGAN E. COLLINS, EMILY M. GLAZENER, CHRISTINA D. STEWART &
JAMES P. LYNCH, FOLLOW-UP REPORT TO THE MSCCSP: USING ASSESSMENT
INSTRUMENTS DURING CRIMINAL SENTENCING 10 (2015) (“[T]he LSI-R and LS/CMI
are proprietary tools offered by Multi-Health Systems Inc.”).
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Malenchik argued, as relevant here, (1) that “such models have not
been recognized as scientifically reliable so as to qualify for
admissibility under Indiana Evidence Rule[s]”; (2) “that the scoring
models lack objective reliability”; (3) “they are not relevant to
statutory aggravating circumstances”; (4) “they are unfairly
discriminatory”; (5) “the use of the LSI–R test in this case impinged
upon his right to counsel”; (6) “the use of scoring models conflicts
with Indiana’s constitutional requirement that the penal code be
founded on principles of reformation and not vindictive justice”; and
(7) “using such scores may lead to an unwise fundamental change
in Indiana’s sentencing system.”69 The State countered that the
algorithmic tools were permissible because they were “employed
consistently with [their] proper purposes and limitations.”70
Ultimately, the court found that the use of algorithmic RATs was
not unlawful for sentencing decisions because the tools enhance and
supplement considerations for judges making such determinations,
as opposed to deciding on their own a defendants’ sentencing
outcome.71
As to the objective reliability of the algorithmic instruments,
the court repeatedly asserted that scoring models, particularly LSI–
R, have “widespread acceptance” and are “widely recognized as
valid and reliable” by governmental and scholarly communities.72
The court assured that these algorithmic tools do not constitute
aggravating circumstances, but rather help judges make
comprehensive sentencing evaluations.73 Although Malenchik
argued that LSI–R was discriminatory because “a person’s family
disharmony, economic status, personal preferences, or social
circumstances should never bear any weight with a sentencing
judge,”74 the court disagreed. The court instead reasoned that
sentencing courts were statutorily mandated to consider these

69. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 567–68.
70. Id. at 568.
71. Id. at 573–74.
72. Id. at 568–71 (finding that “academic literature has demonstrated for
decades [that] objective actuarial risk/needs instruments more accurately predict
risk and identify criminogenic needs than the clinical judgment of officers,” and these
models “are well supported by empirical data and provide target areas to change an
individual’s criminal behavior, thereby enhancing public safety”).
73. Id. at 572 (“The nature of the LSI–R is not to function as a basis for finding
aggravating circumstances, nor does an LSI–R score constitute such a circumstance.
But LSI–R scores are highly useful and important for trial courts to consider as a
broad statistical tool to supplement and inform the judge’s evaluation of information
and sentencing formulation in individual cases.”).
74. Id. at 574 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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factors in PSIs.75 Addressing the overarching goals and purposes of
the algorithmic tools, the court asserted that the tools did not
violate the Indiana Constitution because they “provide usable
information based on extensive penal and sociological research to
assist the trial judge in crafting individualized sentencing schemes
with a maximum potential for reformation.”76 As such, the court
concluded that algorithmic risk assessments serve an appropriate
purpose in line with the current prescribed sentencing objectives
and limitations, and would not significantly change the sentencing
system.77
C. Houston Federation of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston
Independent School District
No federal court has opined on the issue of algorithmic risk
assessments used in the criminal justice system. However, a
teacher’s union representing over 6,000 members filed a federal
civil suit alleging that a privately owned algorithmic tool used by
the Houston Independent School District (hereinafter the School
District) to terminate teachers for ineffective performance during
the 2011–2015 school years violated, in part, their constitutional
right to equal protection.78 The tool, Educational Value–Added
Assessment System (hereinafter EVAAS), generally “compar[es]
the average test score growth of students taught by the teacher
compared to the statewide average for students in that grade or

75. See id.; IND. CODE § 35-38-1-9(b)(2).
76. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 575.
77. Notably, in 2015, 30,347 people were incarcerated in Indiana prisons, where
“Black people constituted 10% of state residents, but . . . 34% of people in prison” and
“Black people were incarcerated at 2.7 times the rate of [W]hite people . . . .” VERA
INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION TRENDS IN INDIANA 1–2 (2019), https://www.vera
.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-indiana.pdf [https://perma
.cc/S5MT-YNZE]. “In 2018, there were 23,844 people in the Wisconsin prison
system,” where “Black people constituted 7% of state residents, but . . . 41% of people
in prison” and “[i]n 2017, Black people were incarcerated at 10.9 times the rate of
[W]hite people . . . .” VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION TRENDS IN WISCONSIN 1–
2 (2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trendswisconsin.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WMD-7M2G].
78. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Loc. 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp.
3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017). The plaintiffs also claimed procedural and
substantive due process violations, which will not be discussed in this Article. See id.
at 1173 (asserting that plaintiffs raised violations of “1. procedural due process, due
to lack of sufficient information to meaningfully challenge terminations based on low
EVAAS scores; 2. substantive due process, because there is no rational relationship
between EVAAS scores and HISD’s goal of employing effective teachers; 3.
substantive due process, because the EVAAS system is too vague to provide notice
to teachers of how to achieve higher ratings and avoid adverse employment
consequences”).
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course.”79 Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the School District’s
policy of aligning teachers’ instructional performance ratings with
EVAAS scores, which “subverts the independence of the
instructional practice score,” wrongly classified teachers with no
rational explanation.80
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas admitted
that plaintiffs presented a “novel claim” with no controlling
precedent in an analogous context.81 Nevertheless, the court
rejected plaintiff’s argument, finding that the termination policy
was not a classification system.82 Assuming there was a
classification, the court found that EVAAS passed rational basis
review under a substantive due process claim—the same standard
it would have applied to an equal protection claim. In analyzing the
due process claim, the court found that even if the algorithmic tool
was imperfect, “the loose constitutional standard of rationality
allows governments to use blunt tools which may produce only
marginal results.”83 As such, the district court denied summary
judgment on the substantive due process claim.84
III. An Equal Protection Analysis of Algorithmic Risk
Assessments
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
declares that “[no] State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is essentially a
direction that “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.”85 An Equal Protection claim may be raised when the state
facially classifies individuals or when it acts discriminatorily “as
applied.”86 Facial classifications are reviewed under tiered levels of
scrutiny.87 “As applied” classifications are reviewed under the same
scheme, but claimants must also prove there was a discriminatory

79. Id. at 1172.
80. Id. at 1183.
81. Id. (“This appears to be a novel claim, and the court has found no authority
addressing an equal protection claim in an analogous context.”).
82. Id. at 1175.
83. Id. at 1182.
84. Id. at 1183.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920)).
86. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
87. Facially Neutral Laws Implicating a Racial Minority, LIBRARY CONG.: CONST.
ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt14-S1-4-1-3-1-4/AL
DE_00000825/ [https://perma.cc/6A5K-LXYQ].
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impact and intent by the state.88 Race and ethnicity are considered
suspect classifications reviewed under strict scrutiny.89 To trigger
this level of scrutiny, members of the class must be treated
categorically differently, which this Article argues is the case in the
pretrial detention context.90 Such classifications must be narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling government interest. 91 If a court finds
that the use of race or ethnicity does not pass muster under its
appropriate level of scrutiny, the law or policy is declared
unconstitutional.
Here, the overarching question is whether the government is
violating criminal defendants’ Equal Protection rights by using
algorithmic assessments that include race and ethnicity to calculate
risk scores used for pretrial determinations. From the Loomis and
Houston Federation of Teachers, Local 2415 opinions, it seems very
likely that courts will treat algorithm-based classifications within
the existing Equal Protection tiered-scrutiny framework.92 First, we
argue there is significant evidence to show that the government
facially classifies individuals impermissibly. However, even
assuming, arguendo, that the risk assessment classifications are
facially neutral, we then argue that they have a disparate impact,
and that the government intentionally discriminated on the basis of
race under one of three types of legal intentionality (deliberate
indifference to racial targeting, discriminatory animus from
algorithm designers, or discriminatory intent from the algorithm
itself). Lastly, we show how the use of algorithmic assessments is
not narrowly tailored to meet the government’s purported goal of
reducing bias in pretrial adjudications and how the government
cannot meet its burden of proving RATs are narrowly tailored, due
to the opacity of the algorithms’ black box mechanisms.
A. Algorithmic Risk Assessments Explicitly Use Suspect
Classifications
Race and ethnicity are suspect classifications.93 An Equal
Protection Clause challenge based on these classifications must be
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1192–93 (2017);
see, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251–57 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 312–16 (2003).
91. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 246.
92. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016); Hous. Fed’n of
Teachers, Loc. 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
93. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 216 (1995); Regents of
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reviewed under strict scrutiny because they “are simply too
pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between
justification and classification.”94 Generally, suspect classifications,
especially racial classifications, must be used as a “last resort.”95
And in such cases, they must be narrowly tailored to meet the
government’s stated compelling interest.96
Creators of algorithmic RATs deny using suspect
classifications in their calculations.97 For instance, one of the major
market competitors selling regression-based RATs is Northpointe,
Inc. (now doing business as Equivant). Their algorithmic risk
assessment tool COMPAS, the one at issue in Loomis, is used by
many states, including New York and California, both of which rank
in the top five states with the largest pretrial detainee population.98
Northpointe firmly denies that COMPAS uses race as a variable,
but due to the proprietary nature of their algorithm, Northpointe
refuses to reveal its variables.99 However, there is strong scholarly
consensus that algorithmic risk assessments almost all use static
factors like race, either explicitly or in other ways.100
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
94. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
95. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)); see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2237 (2016)
(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 519).
96. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 21; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
97. See Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact
Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 80 (2017) (“[O]rganizations
do not intend to discriminate and do not use sensitive classifiers like race and
gender.”); see also SARAH PICARD, MATT WATKINS, MICHAEL REMPEL & ASHMINI
KERODAL, BEYOND THE ALGORITHM: PRETRIAL REFORM, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND
RACIAL FAIRNESS 5 (2018) (stating “[t]he tool did not explicitly use race or ethnicity
in calculating risk scores”).
98. See Jason Tashea, Risk-Assessment Algorithms Challenged in Bail,
Sentencing and Parole Decisions, A.B.A. J. (2017), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/algorithm_bail_sentencing_parole [https://perma.cc/P6FY-FFBJ]
(identifying California, Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin as states that have
adopted the use of COMPAS); see also Wanda Bertman & Alexi Jones, How Many
People in Your State Go to Local Jails Every Year?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept.
18, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/09/18/state-jail-bookings/ [https://
perma.cc/R6DA-U6RS] (comparing the number of jailed individuals in various states
and the seriousness of their offenses).
99. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting
Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES, 1, 1 (2018), https://advances.sciencemag.org/
content/4/1/eaao5580 [https://perma.cc/EE4B-27MV] (“[T]he data used by COMPAS
do not include an individual’s race . . . .”).
100. See, e.g., Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled”
Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 270–96 (2013); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy
for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237–43 (2015);
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Even assuming that race is not explicitly used in algorithmic
RATs, there is substantial evidence proving that many of these tools
use other variables as proxies for race.101 In an American Society of
Criminology handbook on risk assessments, for example, the risk
assessment scholar Robert Brame concluded that “one of the
important lessons of the methodological literature on risk
assessment is that leaving variables like race and ethnicity out of
[the] recidivism risk assessments guarantees that they will still be
there.”102 Similarly, an analysis of an algorithmic risk assessment
designed to replicate the PSA (which is used in more than forty
jurisdictions) found that the PSA algorithm included information on
detainee race via proxy variables, concluding that “there are likely
no truly [racially] uncorrelated input variables in real-world data,
and, as a result, that likely all of the commonly used algorithms
may violate core principles underlying antidiscrimination law by
allowing race to contaminate predictions of risk.”103 The consensus
is strong that risk assessments use race either explicitly or
implicitly through proxies.
Even if racial proxies are used, laws and policies that employ
proxies are commonplace, so the question is whether the proxy acts
as a means to an impermissible end.104 Equal Protection doctrine
requires that the government state a legitimate purpose for nonsuspect classifications.105 However, a claimant may challenge the
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2251–54 (2019).
101. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (2014) (arguing
that, by directing judges to use these algorithmic risk assessments, they are directed
to “explicitly consider a variety of variables . . . not just in special contexts in which
one of those variables might be particularly relevant (for instance, ability to pay in
cases involving fines), but routinely, in all cases. This is not a fringe development”);
see also Sonja B. Starr, The Risk Assessment Era: An Overdue Debate, 27 FED. SENT’G
REP. 205, 205–06 (2015) (drawing on scholarship that argues risk factors like prior
arrests become proxies for race).
102. Robert Brame, Static Risk Factors and Criminal Recidivism, in HANDBOOK
ON RISK AND NEED ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 67, 82 (Faye S. Taxman ed.,
2016) (providing a generalized test of this finding using a simulated dataset with
known covariance between race and other factors).
103. Crystal S. Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New
Statistical and Legal Framework, 119 MICH. L. REV. 291, 371 (2020).
104. See Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the
Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REV. 315, 328 (1998) (“The dominant inquiry of Equal
Protection case law is about fit: How tight is the correlation between the trait used
in the statute and its purported target?”).
105. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968, 985 (1996) (stating, “to the extent
that race is used as a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring
strict scrutiny is in operation[,]” and “[o]ur Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and
reinforcement of racial stereotypes”).
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state’s purported purpose if the non-suspect classification
ultimately serves a non-legitimate end or as a stand-in for a suspect
classification, and courts are likely to strike them as unlawful.106
The Supreme Court has also applied this reasoning within the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process framework.107
Algorithmic assessment tools have been found to use some
variables as stand-ins for suspect classifications, as data scientists
are generally sanctioned from using race and ethnicity altogether.
The nonprofit coalition Partnership on AI found that these
assessment tools use “imperfect proxies such as crime reports or
arrests” to calculate the likely possibility of recidivism.108
Recidivism is measured by these algorithms as whether the
defendant is likely to get arrested before trial, rather than whether
the defendant will commit a crime, per se.109 This definition of
recidivism, which does not narrowly capture the “public safety”
objective in pretrial determinations, is chosen by data scientists
because “the target for prediction (having actually committed a
crime) is unavailable” as a variable.110 The choice to define
recidivism this way, however, presents a significant problem,
considering contacts with the criminal justice system are not
equally distributed, particularly around racial groups.111 In essence,
106. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 609 (2d Cir.
2016) (explaining that terms like “affordable housing” served as “[r]acially charged
code words [which] may provide evidence of discriminatory intent”) (quoting Smith
v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir. 2010)); Floyd v. City of New
York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Crime suspect data may serve as a
reliable proxy for the pool of criminals exhibiting suspicious behavior. But there is
no reason to believe that crime suspect data provides a reliable proxy for the pool of
non-criminals exhibiting suspicious behavior. Because the overwhelming majority of
people stopped fell into the latter category, there is no support for the City’s position
that crime suspect data provides a reliable proxy for the pool of people exhibiting
suspicious behavior.”).
107. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (explaining
that gender “may not serve as a proxy for bias” for removing jurors through
peremptory strikes).
108. P’SHIP ON AI, REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN THE U.S.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16 (2019), https://www.partnershiponai.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Report-on-Algorithmic-Risk-Assessment-Tools.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3E2-CD3M].
109. Id. n.14.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald, The Downstream Effects
of Bail and Pretrial Detention on Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 108 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 775, 801 (2018); David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial
and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55, 73–74 (2008); Rory Kramer &
Brianna Remster, Stop, Frisk, and Assault? Racial Disparities in Police Use of Force
During Investigatory Stops, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 960, 986–88 (2018); Sandra G.
Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV. 971,
1016–17 (2020); Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-
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policy-salient variables like criminality and arrest become proxies
for race.
Partnership for AI also determined that “in complex settings
like criminal justice, virtually all statistical predictions will be
biased even if the data was accurate, and even if variables such as
race are excluded, unless specific steps are taken to measure and
mitigate bias.”112 To do so, the data are trained by inputting
variables that mimic omitted variables that are relevant causal
factors. But these variables may be highly correlated with race or
explicitly serve as proxies for race.113 The ACLU has argued that
data like a defendant’s age, substance use, family relationships, and
community ties can serve, alone and together, as proxies for race.114
These variables are clearly legally permissible when employed for
legitimate purposes, but in this context, they serve as stand-ins for
race and ethnicity.
In machine learning risk assessments, race or its proxies are
also used in a slightly different way—that is, in the training data
through which the artificial intelligence learns about the world and
how to make predictions about recidivism. A 2017 study published
in Science found that “standard machine learning can acquire
stereotyped biases from textual data that reflect everyday human
culture.”115 Researchers found that historic biases and stereotyped
attitudes involving race can permeate the training data used by
algorithms, even if training data explicitly exclude race and
ethnicity as variables.116 While the algorithm may or may not itself
expressly use race in the black box decision-making of its
Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1194–1200 (2018).
112. P’SHIP ON AI, supra note 108, at 18.
113. Id.
114. ACLU OF KANSAS, CHALLENGING PRE-TRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS (2019),
https://www.kscourts.org/KSCourts/media/KsCourts/court%20administration/Pretri
al_Justice_Task_Force/PJTFReporttoKansasSupremeCourt.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HA3T-J7YR].
115. Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson & Arvind Narayanan, Semantics Derived
Automatically from Language Corpora Contain Human-like Biases, 356 SCIENCE
183, 183 (2017).
116. Id. at 185; see also David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Peter Hull, Measuring Racial
Discrimination in Algorithms 2 (Becker Friedman Inst. Working Paper No. 2020184, 2020) (finding that “a sophisticated machine learning algorithm discriminates
against Black defendants, even though defendant race and ethnicity are not included
in the training data. The algorithm recommends releasing [W]hite defendants before
trial at an 8 percentage point (11 percent) higher rate than Black defendants with
identical potential for pretrial misconduct, with this unwarranted disparity
explaining 77 percent of the observed racial disparity in algorithmic
recommendations. We find a similar level of algorithmic discrimination with
regression-based recommendations, using a model inspired by a widely used pretrial
risk assessment tool”).
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predictions, the algorithm’s construction and training may be
racialized because of the initial use of deeply racialized data. In
other words, the criminal justice system is so deeply racist that by
using criminal justice data to train algorithms, developers are
creating naively racist artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligences
are tasked with figuring out how to predict future rearrest before
trial as their singular focus without legal restrictions on how to
approach this goal.117 These artificial intelligences are therefore
dutifully examining patterns in the data and accurately detecting
that in the recent past, at least, one of the best ways to predict who
will be arrested in the future is to consider either the color of their
skin or closely correlated proxies for race.
In addition, training an algorithm to make decisions may
inadvertently create feedback loops that ultimately classify people
based on their race and ethnicity. For example, the Netflix moviestreaming algorithm presents users with many options, and the
user ultimately makes a choice that is then introduced as new
knowledge that trains the algorithm to choose other movies.118 The
algorithm, however, does not consider that the user’s choice was
originally shown by the algorithm. As a result, a user receives
recommendations similar to the choice the user initially made.
Similarly, in the criminal justice context, poor minority groups are
more likely to score higher in risk assessment predictions because
the tools have large amounts of their data, which puts them at risk
of more policing and indictments (which creates more data),
ultimately reinforcing the systems’ biases towards these groups.119
In other words, the outcomes of predictions unjustly influence
future predictions.
One objection that has been raised is that algorithmic risk
assessments might not trigger strict scrutiny because they do not
consistently and categorically disadvantage members of the suspect
class. With machine-learning algorithms in particular, it has been
argued that “consideration of class membership will not necessarily,
or
even
often,
give
rise
to
categorically
different
treatment . . . [because] . . . most machine-learning applications
will be used to forecast complex phenomena . . . that are not easily

117. See generally RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 34 (explaining various forms
and methods of machine learning relevant to algorithms).
118. David Chong, Deep Dive into Netflix’s Recommender System, TOWARDS DATA
SCI. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://towardsdatascience.com/deep-dive-into-netflixsrecommender-system-341806ae3b48 [https://perma.cc/RS4G-7HZ2].
119. See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018).
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predicted by standard, less powerful, statistical techniques.”120
However, even if that were the case more generally for algorithmic
risk assessments, in the pretrial detention context, and particularly
with respect to regression-based RATs, there is compelling evidence
that algorithmic RATs treat racial groups differently, as will be
further discussed below.121
In short, there is significant proof that algorithmic RATs
classify individuals based on their race and ethnicity. These
algorithms either explicitly use racial assumptions or
impermissibly use variables as proxies for race. Algorithms can also
engage in feedback loops, where racial biases are reinforced through
the dynamism between inputs and outputs of data. Most
importantly, how could a court know whether a privately owned
algorithm actually uses suspect classifications as variables if they
are not reviewable due to the proprietary nature of the tool? And
similarly, how can courts examine whether proxy variables are
legally permissible because they purportedly serve a legitimate
purpose? The assertion of opacity of algorithms is not a valid
argument of constitutional soundness.
B. Substantial Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and
Disparate Impact
A court may find that state actors are not explicitly classifying
individuals based on their race or ethnicity. However, a criminal
defendant may still raise an Equal Protection claim by showing that
algorithmic risk assessments result in racially disparate treatment
of individuals, so long as it was motivated by racial animus. In
Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that a claimant may
use racial impact as a relevant fact that bears on the question of
racial intent—the key element.122 The Court has also clarified that
disparate treatment must be “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”123 Therefore, an
Equal Protection challenge of this nature must necessarily include
proof of disparate treatment and discriminatory intent.

120. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 90, at 1196.
121. See, e.g., id., n.232 (“Regression analysis is more susceptible [than machine
learning] to tacit bias because it is driven by theories about how individuals are likely
to behave.”); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68
DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019) (demonstrating that constitutional law is unsuited to correct
racial discrimination resulting from using RATs in the criminal justice system).
122. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
123. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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1. Racial and Ethnic Disparate Impact
There is ample evidence that many algorithmic RATs used in
criminal adjudications impact defendants differently based on their
race or ethnicity. For instance, a ProPublica study analyzed the
COMPAS risk score assessments for more than seven thousand
people arrested in Broward County, Florida between 2013 and
2014.124 They concluded that predictions were biased against Black
defendants.125 The analysis showed that while the overall accuracy
of risk predictions for both Black and White defendants were very
similar (61%), “[B]lack [individuals] are almost twice as likely as
[W]hite [individuals] to be labeled a higher risk but not actually reoffend.”126 Conversely, White defendants received false negatives
almost twice as often as their Black counterparts.127 Similarly,
University of Texas, Austin Law Professor Melissa Hamilton’s
study, which used the same dataset as ProPublica, found that
COMPAS “is not well calibrated for Hispanics” in almost identical
ways.128 Put differently, COMPAS risk scores favor White
defendants with both false positives and negatives.129

124. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/QES8-KCKE].
125. See id.; see also Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate
Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153, 161
(2017) (using the ProPublica data, researchers “demonstrate[d]” how using a
recidivism prediction instrument that has “different false postive [sic] and false
negative rates between groups can lead to disparate impact when individuals
assessed as high risk receive stricter penalties”); see also Melissa Hamilton,
Investigating Algorithmic Risk and Race, 5 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 53, 97–98
(2021) (finding that the PSA RAT has racially disparate impacts, demonstrates
racialized group bias, and inconsistently classifies and predicts White and Black
outcomes in ways that are not consistent with prevailing theories of algorithmic
fairness). But see WILLIAM DIETERICH, CHRISTINA MENDOZA & TIM BRENNAN,
NORTHPOINTE, INC., RSCH. DEP’T, COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING
ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY (2016) (disputing ProPublica’s
allegations); but cf. Jeff Larson & Julia Angwin, Technical Response to Northpointe,
PROPUBLICA (July 29, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/technical-responseto-northpointe [https://perma.cc/N9N2-LJ9V].
126. See Angwin et al., supra note 124 (finding the “Labeled Higher Risk, But
Didn’t Re-Offend” rates were 44.9% for Black defendants and 23.5% for White
defendants).
127. Id. (finding “Labeled Lower Risk, Yet Did Re-Offend” rates were 28.0% for
Black defendants versus 47.7% for White defendants).
128. Melissa Hamilton, The Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Disparate Impact on
Hispanics, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1553, 1577 (2019).
129. See generally Goel et al., supra note 4, at 6 (providing an overview of recent
research on this issue); see also Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s
Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016) (arguing that algorithms inherit racial
biases in the data they rely on).
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Another factor unique to RATs and disparate impact is that
due to the scale and objective consistency of RATs, some classes of
people could be likely to always get classified as high risk and in
need of incarceration. Advocates of RATs tout the absence of
individual bias or inconsistency in determinations of riskiness, as
compared to fallible human judges spitballing riskiness using their
subjective discretion.130 However, the downside of that consistency
is that any error the algorithm makes is repeated mercilessly every
single time. Compared to humans, there is much less stochastic
variation in the algorithms.131 What this means is that if COMPAS
or the PSA, for instance, determine that someone with a
combination of some particular factors is at high risk of rearrest
before trial, every member of that suspect classification will also be
rated high risk. With judicial discretion, there is always room for
the statistical error of mercy or of considering the particularities of
a person’s life that do not show up in models that by design simplify
the messiness of the real world. The algorithms lack any such
unexpected divergence from their predictions, since unconstrained
algorithms are designed to objectively maximize predictive validity
as best as possible, without subjective mercy or distraction.132 When
combined with the scale of their use, where every judge in a state
might be relying on the exact same RAT, the potential for pretrial
release recommendation becomes very difficult for someone who is
a member of a group identified as high risk by the algorithm. For
defendants with an unlucky combination of variables, it could be
akin to not having any alternative to one particular judge’s
idiosyncratic biases. Any racial or ethnic biases within the
algorithms are multiplied and compounded at scale, relentlessly.133

130. See Joseph J. Avery & Joel Cooper, Racial Bias in Post-Arrest and Pretrial
Decision Making: The Problem and a Solution, 29 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 257,
270–71, 283–85 (2019); see Mayson, supra note 100, at 2278 (“Subjective prediction
is vulnerable to irrational bias.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting
Biases, 86 SOC. RSCH.: AN INT’L Q. 499, 502 (2019) (arguing pretrial judges “suffer
from a cognitive bias that produces severe and systematic errors”).
131. See generally RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 34 (explaining how machine
learning causes algorithms to repeat information with near-perfect consistency).
132. See Sam Corbett-Davies, Sharad Goel, Emma Pierson, Aziz Z. Huq & Avi
Feller, Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness 1–10 (Stan. Univ.,
Working Paper, Feb. 17, 2017). See generally O’NEIL, supra note 12 (arguing for a
similar problem of scale in another context).
133. See generally O’NEIL, supra note 12, at 124 (explaining the process by which
biases are replicated by algorithms).
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2. Discriminatory Intent
We argue below that discriminatory intent may be inferred
from: (1) deliberate indifference to racial targeting; (2)
discriminatory animus from the algorithm’s designer; and (3)
discriminatory intent from the machine.134
First, in Floyd v. City of New York, the district court
determined that “the use of a facially neutral policy applied in a
discriminatory manner, or through express racial profiling,
targeting [minority populations] violates bedrock principles of
equality.”135 At issue in this case was whether the New York Police
Department’s
stop-and-frisk
policy
violated
Fourteenth
Amendment protections of Black and Latino individuals. The court
reasoned that plaintiffs there showed a state “policy of indirect
racial profiling” where the state acted “deliberately indifferent to the
intentionally discriminatory application” of that policy.136
According to the court, a state policy includes “the decisions of a
government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and
practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the
force of law.”137 In Floyd, a policy directing officers to target young
Black and Latino men “based on local crime suspect data” and racial
animosity by the police commissioner were sufficient to prove
intent.138
Regarding algorithmic RATs, states have clearly ignored these
tools’ discriminatory impact on Black and Latino defendants. In
fact, states in the last decade have aggressively enacted legislation
and executive policies mandating the use of these tools, despite
criticism from communities, experts, and advocacy organizations.139
134. See Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of
Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 911 (2018); see also Jason R. Bent,
Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action Legal?, 108 GEO. L.J. 803, 826 (2020) (explaining
how instructions to computers can inject race into the algorithm); see also Coglianese
& Lehr, supra 90, at 1198 (acknowledging that some opponents of algorithms argue
the inclusion of a race variable itself shows discriminatory intent); see also Floyd v.
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding a facially neutral
police policy failed strict scrutiny where it resulted in higher levels of stops among
non-White drivers).
135. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 664. Companies like Equivant, which owns
COMPAS, claim they do not engage in express racial profiling, but, as argued above,
that is either false or they use proxies impermissibly to racially profile.
136. Id. at 660.
137. Id. at 558, 564 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)).
138. Id. at 660.
139. See, e.g., Tom Simonite, Algorithms Should’ve Made Courts More Fair. What
Went Wrong?, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/algorithmsshouldve-made-courts-more-fair-what-went-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/B9K4-7RAS]
(explaining that a 2011 Kentucky law requires judges consider an algorithmic risk
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Moreover, judges have used algorithmic risk assessments in ways
that disadvantage Black defendants, and which a reasonable person
would expect them to be aware disadvantage Black defendants. A
2019 study by the Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics, and Business found that “judges were more likely to
override the [bail] recommended default for moderate risk [B]lack
defendants than similar moderate risk [W]hite defendants,” likely
“suggest[ing] that interaction with the same predictive score may
lead to different predictions by race.”140 The study further argued
that such results may be caused by judges being unresponsive to
policy changes or acting with racial animosity.141
As such, a Floyd intent framework could be applied to
algorithmic RATs because state actors have both deliberately
ignored the adverse effects on Black and Latino defendants, as well
as mandated their use without consideration of scientific studies
warning against their use.142
Second, human bias from data scientists creating and training
the algorithms may encroach into the data.143 A data scientist
makes a series of choices when designing the formulas to be used
by the algorithmic tool. As University of Chicago Law School
Professor Aziz Z. Huq explains: “an algorithm’s designer might be
motivated by either an animosity toward a racial group, or else a
prior belief that race correlates with criminality, and then
deliberately design the algorithm on that basis.”144 Such designmaking “might occur through either a choice to use polluted
assessment when posting bail); see also Elizabeth Hardison, After Nearly a Decade,
Pa. Sentencing Commission Adopts Risk Assessment Tool Over Objections of Critics,
PA. CAPITAL-STAR (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.penncapital-star.com/criminaljustice/after-nearly-a-decade-pa-sentencing-commission-adopts-risk-assessmenttool-over-objections-of-critics/ [https://perma.cc/RPC7-9VK3] (illustrating a 2019
Pennsylvania law adopting the use of algorithmic risk assessment for sentencing
determinations).
140. Alex Albright, If You Give a Judge a Risk Score: Evidence from Kentucky Bail
Decisions 1 (Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper
Series, Discussion Paper No. 85, 2019), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin
_center/Prizes/2019-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA78-EZHC].
141. Id. at 25.
142. See Angwin et al., supra note 124 (finding that from a sample of seven
thousand criminal defendants in Broward County, Florida, Black defendants were
“77 percent more likely to be pegged as at higher risk of committing a future violent
crime and 45 percent more likely to be predicted to commit a future crime of any
kind” than their White counterparts, controlling for race, gender, age, criminal
history, and recidivism).
143. See P’SHIP ON AI, supra note 108, at 15–22; see also SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE,
ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018)
(explaining how human bias encroaches into computer programs run by algorithms).
144. Huq, supra note 121, at 1089.
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training data or the deliberate selection of some features but not
others on racial grounds.”145 Some state courts have singled out
algorithms’ developers as legally responsible for the algorithms in
some respects.146 However, the opaque or proprietary nature of the
algorithmic tools may prohibit defendants from determining how
the data scientist designed the algorithm. If the algorithm is
unreviewable, then it is challenging to directly detect the designer’s
motivation.
Indirect evidence of intentionality can be deduced from an
important mathematical proof by the statisticians Jon Kleinberg
and colleagues, which has since been replicated.147 Analyzing the
ProPublica COMPAS data, they found that there are three main
ways to operationalize racial equality: racial equality of false
negatives, racial equality of false positives, and racial parity of
outcomes.148 They proved that in a context of unequal initial
conditions (i.e., racial disparity in recidivism rates), it is
mathematically impossible for the three types of equality to be
achieved simultaneously, so there is a necessary trade-off between
the three forms of equality.149 This trade-off implies that creators of
the assessments are making choices about trade-offs, intentionally
or unintentionally. Minimizing racial inequality in risk
assessments became such a priority among legal and policy
decision-makers that most current assessments include attempts to
minimize racial disparities.150 Kleinberg and colleagues’ proof then
implies that any intentional act of reducing inequality in one
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., People v. Wakefield, 175 A.D.3d 158, 169–70 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
(holding that the “true accuser” within a Confrontation Clause challenge was the
writer of the source code for an algorithm used in software that calculates the
probability of a defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, considering that said
algorithmic source code writer was “the declarant in the epistemological, existential
and legal sense rather than the sophisticated and highly automated tool powered by
electronics and source code that he created”), lv denied, 34 N.Y.3d 1083 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2019), lv granted, 35 N.Y.3d 1097 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
147. JON KLEINBERG, SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & MANISH RAGHAVAN, INHERENT
TRADE-OFFS IN THE FAIR DETERMINATION OF RISK SCORES (2017),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BGF-WZU5].
148. See id. at 4. There are other models of equality, but similar arguments hold
for those models. See Huq, supra note 121, at 1053 (2019) (arguing that the law
“provides no creditable guidance” about which model of fairness or equality to apply
to risk assessments); Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kerns &
Aaron Roth, Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, 50
SOCIO. METHODS & RSCH., 3, 34–35 (2021).
149. KLEINBERG ET AL., supra note 147, at 17.
150. Joseph J. Avery & Joel Cooper, Racial Bias in Post-Arrest and Pretrial
Decision Making: The Problem and a Solution, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 257,
289 (2019).
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dimension necessarily involves intentionally increasing inequality
in one of the other dimensions. Assessment developers cannot argue
that remaining inequalities were unintentional or incidental since
the trade-offs force a developer to make a choice between
inequalities.
Third, for machine learning algorithmic RATs, can intent also
be inferred from decisions made by machines based on their “deep
learning” and autonomous decision-making?151 The Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on whether machines that replace human
decision-making should be treated like natural persons for Equal
Protection intent purposes. Still, there is great interest in the
question of legal personhood for artificial entities and autonomous
devices.152 For instance, judges are barred from considering race
and ethnicity when making bail or sentencing determinations.153
However, judges rely on an algorithmic assessment that, as
mentioned above, directly or indirectly uses prohibited
classifications. Furthermore, the machine is able to learn and apply
racial biases and stereotypes (racial animosity), as in the case of the
Netflix algorithm. The algorithm selects a defendant’s features to
make a choice of who the defendant is, without ever needing to use
race or ethnicity as a factor. The machine then would be liable for
discriminatory intent just like a court officer who created a bail
determination report or PSI.154 In other words, if one treats a
151. These arguments about AI’s intermediate level of legal intentionality do not
as clearly apply to regression-based RATs because their algorithms are not
inherently opaque and independent like the machine learning RATs. However, that
makes the regression-based RATs more likely to be found to use race facially (or some
other elements discussed above), and machine learning RATs more likely to pass a
facial discrimination Equal Protection Clause review, but fail a disparate impact
plus intent review.
152. See Gerhard Wagner, Robot, Inc.: Personhood for Autonomous Systems?, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 591, 593 (2019) (prepared for the symposium Rise of the Machines:
Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law); see also Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (expanding personhood rights
for artificial corporate entities based on an Equal Protection claim); Anat Lior, AI
Entities as AI Agents: Artificial Intelligence Liability and the AI Respondeat Superior
Analogy, 46 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1043 (2020) (arguing for the application of
strict liability to humans responsible for damages caused by AI entities acting as the
human’s agent).
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (“The Commission shall assure that the [sentencing]
guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national
origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.”); U.S. PROB. OFF. FOR THE W.
DIST. OF N.C., THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT: A GUIDE TO THE
PRESENTENCE PROCESS 6 (2009) (“[C]ertain demographic data such as age, race and
sex are precluded from consideration in the sentencing process both by statute and
by the guidelines . . . .”).
154. See Kimberly Mok, Mathwashing: How Algorithms Can Hide Gender and
Racial Biases, NEW STACK (Dec. 8, 2017), https://thenewstack.io/hidden-gender-
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machine as a human, would we permit the human to do this? Here,
absent judicial precedent, the answer is likely no. Thus, while the
Loomis and Malenchik courts held that algorithmic assessments
are one of many factors considered by a judge in making sentencing
determinations, treating these tools as human-like systems may
alter judicial review of the intent issue.
A useful legal model has been developed in Germany155 that
could be applied to the most advanced RATs.156 In the German
model of Teilrechtsfähigkeit, or partial legal capacity, advanced
machine-learning algorithms such as unsupervised machine
learning RATs would be treated as legal subjects in some limited
ways that entail some independent legal capacity under the indirect
supervision of humans. In this partial legal capacity model,
algorithms “are not legal persons with full legal capacity, they are
still legal subjects, yet the range of their subjectivity is limited by
their specific functions.”157 Some U.S. courts have already
suggested that more independent AI systems could have something
like Teilrechtsfähigkeit in, for example, the context of Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause challenges.158 In the pretrial risk
racial-biases-algorithms-can-big-deal/ [https://perma.cc/7343-PLYN] (“In one recent
study which trained an off-the-shelf machine learning AI system on 2.2 million
words, Princeton University researchers used a word-association technique to map
out what kind of links the system would [make] between words and concepts. It found
that the system would associate words such as ‘flower’ and ‘music’ as being more
pleasant concepts than words like ‘insects’ and ‘weapons.’”).
155. Jan-Erik Schirmer, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Personality: Introducing
“Teilrechtsfähigkeit”: A Partial Legal Status Made in Germany, in REGULATING
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 123 (Thomas Wischmeyer & Timo Rademacher eds., 2020)
(“[I]ntelligent agents would be treated as legal subjects as far as this status followed
their function as sophisticated servants. This would both deflect the ‘autonomy risk’
and fill most of the ‘responsibility gaps’ without the negative side effects of full legal
personhood.”); see also Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF.
L. REV. 513, 549 (proposing “a new category of a legal subject, halfway between
person and object”); Wagner, supra note 152, at 608 (2019) (developing a comparable
intermediary tort liability status for AI systems using “a functional explanation that
is in tune with the general principles and goals of tort law, namely compensation
and deterrence,” which is particularly needed when “people injured by a robot may
face serious difficulties in identifying the party who is responsible for the
misbehavior of the device”).
156. This analysis applies to machine learning RATs since they share important
characteristics with human decision-making, such as processing information
independently without direct human supervision, unlike regression-based RATs that
require direct supervision and would be more comparable to very sophisticated tools.
157. Schirmer, supra note 155, at 135. This model has previously been applied in
Germany to preliminary companies, homeowners’ associations, and fetuses.
158. See People v. Wakefield, 175 A.D.3d 158, 169–70 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
(finding that “an artificial intelligence-type system” involving “distributed cognition
between technology and humans” could itself be a declarant in a Sixth Amendment
challenge, depending on the level of human supervision and the totality of the
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assessment context, machine learning RATs would be legal subjects
only in the sense that they are responsible for independently
performing functions for human subjects,159 such as using race to
accurately predict risk of recidivism. Legal questions about
artificial intelligence will only become more common in the near
future, and the model of partial legal capacity could resolve many
pressing legal dilemmas, such as conflicts involving driverless
cars.160
C. Algorithmic Risk Assessments Do Not Pass Judicial
Strict Scrutiny
The last step of a suspect class Equal Protection analysis
requires a showing that the means chosen to achieve a compelling
government interest be narrowly tailored. Many states purportedly
employ algorithmic RATs to eliminate or reduce racial disparities
in the criminal justice system.161 Proponents also advocate for their
“potential to streamline inefficiencies, reduce costs, and provide
rigor and reproducibility for life-critical decisions.”162 However, the
use of algorithmic assessment tools is not narrowly tailored to meet
those objectives because they are not the least restrictive means
necessary to achieve those government interests—they do not
produce considerably better assessments, and they negatively
influence judges. Further, the opacity of many RATs makes it
impossible for the government to meet its burden of proof that they
are narrowly tailored.
Studies have found that algorithmic risk calculations for
recidivism are no more accurate or less racially biased than human
predictions. For example, a high-profile 2018 Dartmouth University
study found that COMPAS risk calculations were “nearly identical”
circumstances); see also Itiel E. Dror & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Use of Technology
in Human Expert Domains: Challenges and Risks Arising from the Use of Automated
Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensic Science, 9 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 47,
48–49 (2010).
159. See Schirmer, supra note 155, at 136 (emphasizing that algorithmic partial
legal capacity does not require complete intentional autonomy, since a “trading
algorithm does not trade on its own account, but on the account of the person who
deploys it. In other words, we are looking at the typical ‘master-servant situation’, in
which the servant acts autonomously, but at the same time only on the master’s
behalf”).
160. See generally Neal Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO.
L.J. 1685 (2014) (discussing the potential problems arising from the development of
mass surveillance, 3D printing, and driverless cars).
161. Id.; see Adam Neufeld, Commentary: In Defense of Risk-Assessment Tools,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/22/
in-defense-of-risk-assessment-tools [https://perma.cc/FU5T-YJH7].
162. P’SHIP ON AI, supra note 108, at 7.
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to untrained humans at predicting recidivism.163 The study also
confirmed ProPublica’s finding that COMPAS racially
disproportionately assigns false positives and negatives to criminal
defendants, showing that these tools are no better than judges
overall.164 Further, they found that, although COMPAS uses 137
variables in an opaque algorithm, the same accuracy could be
achieved with a simple linear regression with only two variables:
age and total number of previous convictions.165 These two
equivalent and more narrowly tailored alternatives suggest that
risk assessments like COMPAS are not the least restrictive means
necessary to achieve the state’s objectives.
Judges are supposed to consider, but not rely on, algorithmic
assessments in pretrial adjudications.166 However, studies find that
judges sometimes completely rely or are heavily influenced by these
assessments. Also known as automation bias, cognitive biases may
cause judges to over-rely on algorithmic assessments because of
“the brain’s natural tendency to rely on heuristics, or simple rules
of thumb, when dealing with complicated mental tasks.”167 The
empirical research on how judges use RATs is limited, but a 2019
Harvard University study simulated pretrial judicial discretion
with respect to automated risk assessments using an online survey
experiment to assess how people make predictions about pretrial
risk, both with and without RATs.168 The results were consistent
with automation bias, with researchers finding that participants’
behavior heavily mimicked that of the algorithms, “which can be
racially biased even when race is not included as an explicit

163. Dressel & Farid, supra note 99, at 3; see Jongbin Jung, Connor Concannon,
Ravi Shroff, Sharad Goel & Daniel G. Goldstein, Simple Rules for Complex Decisions
9 (Stan. Univ., Working Paper, Apr. 4, 2017) (demonstrating that humans using
simple weighted checklists comparable to the early Vera Scale are as accurate as
complex algorithmic risk assessments at predicting rearrest before trial).
164. Dressel & Farid, supra note 99, at 3.
165. See id.
166. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at ¶ 98, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S.
Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-6387); Andrea Nishi, Privatizing Sentencing: A Delegation
Framework for Recidivism Risk Assessment, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1671, 1672 (2019).
167. Andrew Lee Park, Injustice Ex Machina: Predictive Algorithms in Criminal
Sentencing, UCLA L. REV.: L. MEETS WORLD (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.uclalaw
review.org/injustice-ex-machina-predictive-algorithms-in-criminal-sentencing/
[https://perma.cc/5Y4P-43BE] (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1125 (1974)).
168. See Ben Green & Yiling Chen, Disparate Interactions: An Algorithm-in-theLoop Analysis of Fairness in Risk Assessments (Conf. on Fairness, Accountability,
and Transparency, 2019), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/19-fat.pdf [https://perma
.cc/XBT4-VXRB].
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factor.”169 In a related court context, an ongoing study of
prosecutorial discretion suggests that prosecutors were strongly
influenced by RATs, even though they were unaware of what
elements went into the scores.170 Prosecutors who had been
prepared to offer defendants diversion programs were swayed to not
do so “because the risk assessment showed too high of a risk,” even
though after being pressed the prosecutors could not explain the
elements of the score or what determined the risk levels.171
Another weakness in the narrowly tailored step of the Equal
Protection argument could be that some RATs are too opaque to
prove that they are narrowly tailored. As discussed above, machinelearning RATs evolve specific processes on their own in response to
real-world data, so their precise algorithms are not programmed or
known by any human.172 Although regression-based RATs are not
inherently opaque in the same way, RATs like COMPAS are de
facto opaque because their algorithms are protected as trade
secrets. Yet according to the Supreme Court, “[u]nder strict
scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial
classifications are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling government interests.”173 It is the burden of the state to
prove that no other alternative that is less intrusive of the right
could work to achieve those interests. If the black-box algorithms
driving machine learning RATs are by nature too unidentifiable to
prove that they are or are not narrowly tailored (or if corporations
like the designers of COMPAS refuse to open the black box of the
algorithm to prove it), then the government using these risk
assessments would necessarily fail to meet their burden of proof.174
In sum, the government cannot meet its burden of proof that
algorithmic assessment tools are narrowly tailored to meet the
169. Id. at 8.
170. Chiara C. Packard, “The Question Is, Should You Charge?”: A Multi-Site Case
Study Exploring Prosecutor’s Use of Discretion in Wisconsin (Soc’y for the Study of
Soc. Probs. Ann. Conf., 2021).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 90, at 1199 (“Given how machinelearning analysis works on a black-box basis, it is virtually impossible for anyone to
know a priori what a given variable’s likely importance in the algorithm will be or
what its ultimate effects will be on any disparities of predictions.”).
173. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
174. This is less applicable to regression-based algorithms that are more
transparent in their processes, but that transparency in turn makes those RATs
more vulnerable to discriminatory intent claims. For instance, in a defense of
machine learning RATs, Coglianese and Lehr admit that algorithmic “[r]egression
analysis is more susceptible to tacit bias because it is driven by theories about how
individuals are likely to behave.” Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 90, at 1205 n.232.
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government’s purported goal of reducing bias in the criminal justice
system. These tools do not perform better than untrained humans
or judges, nor do they perform better than simple and utterly
transparent regressions of two variables. In addition, they impact
judicial discretion by pointing judges to ultimately make racially
biased determinations. Furthermore, these algorithmic tools carry
significant weight, if not complete weight, in a judge’s
determination of pretrial adjudications. Therefore, algorithmic
assessments are not the least restrictive means necessary to
achieve the state’s purported compelling purpose of, among other
things, reducing biases in judges and releasing more defendants
pretrial.
IV. Limitations and Other Considerations
One major limitation of an Equal Protection challenge against
privately owned RATs is that their algorithms are considered trade
secrets, and therefore it would be hard for courts to evaluate the
legally relevant processes. As a result of their trade secret status,
the algorithms may not be evaluated by the general public or
criminal defendants without consent of the company. Companies
often do not grant consent because it may result in criticism and
revelation of secret information, both of which could cut into
corporate profit.175 Courts have sided with companies on this issue.
For example, in 2014, the Urban Justice Center filed a Freedom of
Information Law (FOIL) request in New York State for COMPAS’s
“instruction manuals, training guides and information regarding
scoring for the COMPAS Reentry Assessment tool,” as part of an
administrative challenge.176 The request was denied because of the
“trade secrets” exemption under FOIL, as “these materials are the
sole property of Northpointe.”177 However, the trade secrecy
argument may empower courts to ban privately-owned algorithms
altogether, since they lack government and public review, as was
mandated by the court in Loomis. In fact, courts could start
reviewing these tools in camera or through protective orders.178
175. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 623 (2013) (discussing the benefits of trade secrets for corporations).
176. Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System 14 n.51 (Apr. 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (“This FOIL request was submitted in connection with an Article 78
ruling finding that the COMPAS tool was not adequately tailored for use on
individuals with mental illness.”).
177. Id.
178. But see Nishi, supra note 166, at 1682–83 n.70 (“Although in civil cases these
protections can be overcome through protective orders or in camera review, the use
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Another limitation is that the Supreme Court requires an
individualized inquiry for Equal Protection challenges. In McClesky
v. Kemp, the Court held that “[s]tatistics at most may show only a
likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions,” and
are usually insufficient to show a particularized injury.179 The Court
reasoned that “the application of an inference drawn from the
general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing”
were permissible in jury selection claims, but not in reviewing
judicial discretion in capital sentencing.180 Pretrial determinations
are closer in the procedural stage to jury selection, but are made by
judges like in capital sentencing determinations. Therefore, in the
event a defendant is unable to review their individualized
assessment due to the algorithm’s proprietary nature and corporate
trade secrecy, it is unclear whether a court would accept statistical
generalizations to find particularized harm of an individual
defendant, particularly in the face of companies who refuse to reveal
their algorithms.
Conclusion
Algorithmic RATs in pretrial adjudication are not
constitutionally sound. Their opacity, biases, judicial influence, and
racially disparate treatment of Black and Latino defendants, all of
whom are legally innocent, likely do not pass muster under the
Equal Protection framework. Nonetheless, many states continue to
advocate for their implementation in the criminal justice system,
especially with bail reform gaining traction in jurisdictions across
the United States.
We reject the idea of modifying or improving these algorithms
to make them marginally less discriminatory, since the
constitutional problems with risk assessments are fundamental,
not fixable at the margins. For example, there is simply no way to
use arrest data algorithmically that is not discriminatory, since
racial discrimination is always already baked into prior arrest data.
Instead, many less racially discriminatory alternatives to pretrial
risk assessments have been proposed, such as public health
approaches to identifying pretrial needs of people charged with
crimes.181 Indeed, major organizations like the Pretrial Justice
of these techniques in the criminal context may conflict with a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial.”).
179. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987).
180. Id. at 294.
181. See, e.g., ALICIA VERANI, RODRIGO PADILLA-HERNANDEZ, TALI GIRES,
KAITLYN FRYZEK, RACHEL PENDLETON, ETHAN VAN BUREN & MÁXIMO LANGER,
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Institute have called for abolition of both bail and algorithmic risk
assessments.182 Similarly, as part of its recent pretrial reforms, New
York City experimented successfully with a system of behavioral
nudges in the form of phone calls and texts reminding people of
court dates, which significantly reduced rates of failing to appear in
court.183
Notwithstanding these promising alternatives, the focus of
this Article is not to comprehensively assess alternatives to risk
assessments, but rather to identify their unconstitutionality. As
argued above, the use of risk assessments is legally impermissible
because it violates the Equal Protection rights of people of color,
who are too often doomed by these algorithms to be swept up into
the system. Machine learning risk assessments in particular are not
narrowly tailored to minimize discrimination; they are naively
racist systems that are inscrutably tailored to maximize predictive
accuracy by any means necessary. Yet no one should be subjected to
the pains of pretrial incarceration because they are a member of a
particular racial or ethnic class. It is time to think beyond
algorithmic risk assessments and reimagine equitable alternatives
to pretrial justice.
CREATING A NEEDS-BASED PRE-TRIAL RELEASE SYSTEM: THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF
MONEY BAIL VERSUS RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS 1 (2019) https://law.ucla.edu/
sites/default/files/PDFs/Academics/CJP
Pretrial
Proposal
2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WTG2-49C5] (proposing a public health approach to pretrial justice
that eschews RATs and prioritizes support services and “a presumption of release”).
182. Updated Position on Pretrial Risk Assessment Tools, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/61d1eb9e51ae915258ce573f/t/
61df34bb945c52230a215be9/1642018002889/PJI+Statement+Against+Risk+Assess
ments [https://perma.cc/538L-3HHM] (arguing that “[r]egardless of their science,
brand, or age, these tools are derived from data reflecting structural racism and
institutional inequity that impact our court and law enforcement policies and
practices. Use of that data then deepens the inequity”); see also The Case Against
Pretrial Risk Assessment Instruments, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (Nov. 2020),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/61d1eb9e51ae915258ce573f/t/61df300e02183
57bb223d689/1642017935113/The+Case+Against+Pretrial+Risk+Assessment+Instr
uments--PJI+2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SDC-5NDZ] (arguing that “[p]retrial risk
assessment instruments (RAIs) are constructed from biased data, so the RAIs
perpetuate racism[;] RAIs are not able to accurately predict whether someone will
flee prosecution or commit a violent crime[;] RAIs label people as ‘risky’ even when
their odds of success are high[;] [and] RAI scores inform conditions of release, but
there is no proven connection between RAI scores, specific conditions, and pretrial
success”).
183. See Russell Ferri, The Benefits of Live Court Date Reminder Phone Calls
During Pretrial Case Processing, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 149, 160 (2022)
(finding that phone call reminders reduced failures to appear by thirty-seven
percent); Alissa Fishbane, Aurelie Ouss & Anuj K. Shah, Behavioral Nudges Reduce
Failure to Appear For Court, 370 SCIENCE 1 (2020) [https://perma.cc/8BNS-YWJ9]
(finding that text message reminders reduced failures to appear by twenty-one
percent, and redesigned forms reduced them by thirteen percent).

